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Abstract. Discussions on the emergence of a European identity meant to provide legitimacy 
to the European Union (EU) o!en include references to factors in"uencing EU support. #ese 
determinants of support are essential in anticipating EU’s future, in solving its legitimacy 
de$cit and for the development of a common European identity. European citizens’ support 
for the EU could be considered a predictor of sense of belonging to the European community 
that actually provides generating elements of European identity. In this context, the present 
article elaborates from a theoretical perspective on the relationship between EU support and 
European identity. First, the goal is to illustrate the theories on factors that strengthen Euro-
pean citizens’ support for the EU, whether economic or non-economic. Second, the focus is 
on establishing the di%erences between support for European integration and the attachment 
that Europeans feel for the EU or between economic rationality and a%ective evaluation in 
regard to the EU. #e article argues that, while the identi$cation of a European identity seems 
increasingly di&cult to attain, this support for European integration could be viewed as a 
temporary solution for solving the legitimacy de$cit the EU su%ers from. 
Keywords: support for European integration, European identity, national identity, costs and 
bene$ts, attachment.
Introduction
Discussions on the emergence of a European identity meant to provide legiti-
macy to the European Union (EU) o!en include references to the factors that 
determine public opinion to support the European integration process. "ey 
are essential in anticipating EU's future, in solving the legitimacy de#cit and 
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for the development of a European identity. European citizens’ support for 
the EU could be considered a predictor of sense of belonging to the European 
project that actually provides generating elements of European identity, but 
also a result of the emergence of a sense of belonging or, more speci#cally, of 
European identity. 
In this paper, European identity and public support for the European Union 
are presented as two attitudes that should not be confused or treated alike as 
the di$erences between the two are being enhanced by the intensity of attach-
ment to the European project. While EU support is determined and empha-
sized by the fact that individuals become aware of their status of European 
citizens with common rights and responsibilities, European identity requires 
the existence of a sense of attachment to the European community with whom 
they share both rights and responsibilities, and a common destiny. On one 
hand, support may determine Europeans to be aware of their EU belonging 
while European identity implies establishing a sense of belonging to the EU. 
In this sense, the relationship between the two attitudes can be bidirectional 
and cyclical. While support for the integration can generate awareness of be-
longing to the European community, European identity can lead to extensive 
support for EU integration at all levels. However, the relationship between the 
two is not necessarily one of proportionality, as low levels of EU identi#cation 
can be correlated with high levels of support for the European community 
and high levels of European identi#cation can be related to low levels of Euro-
pean integration support, depending on context and individuals’ willingness 
to show more instrumental or a$ective interest.
"e goal of this paper is to illustrate the relevant theories on factors that 
strengthen Europeans’ support for the EU, whether economic or non-eco-
nomic, and to discuss on the di$erences between EU support and European 
identity or between rational and a$ective evaluation of European integration. 
Since the identi#cation of a European identity seems increasingly di%cult to 
attain, we consider that support for European integration can be viewed as 
a temporary solution for solving the legitimacy de#cit the European Union 
su$ers from.
As “in any democracy, legitimacy is derived by the perception of the political 
process as originating ‘from the people’ and serving ‘the people’” (Harteveld, 
Van der Meer & De Vries, 2013, p.543), thus we consider that support origi-
nates from the people as a result of their positive rational costs and bene#ts 
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evaluation and trust in a better future as citizens of the European Union. We 
say that economic advantages have greater power in instating support for 
the EU, while non-economic factors determine a more a$ective relationship 
between European citizens and European institutions. While the economic 
costs and bene#ts model is more relevant for EU support, most non-economic 
models are more directly linked to the European sense of identi#cation. For 
example, positive economic and democratic performance and competence is 
related to support, while cultural distinctiveness and the relationship between 
national identity and individuals’ attachment to their countries are better cor-
related with European identi#cation.  
Elements that determine Europeans’ support for the EU
In literature there are used both economic and instrumental explanations and 
non-utilitarian arguments for the assessment of EU public support. Some aca-
demics believe that support for the EU is based on rational arguments focused 
on the costs and bene#ts of the integration process and support is stronger 
when the advantages of integration are directly experienced by its bene#cia-
ries (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Gabel, 1998; Marks 
& Hooghe, 2003; Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt, 2004; Christin, 2005). Given that 
the European Union was created in order to reduce #nancial and physical bar-
riers among states so as to develop a prosperous economic community and to 
facilitate trade among member states, the economic bene#ts argument seems 
to be the most pertinent. 
However, the European Union aims not only to develop itself into an eco-
nomic community but also into a political one and academics consider that 
besides the economic arguments there are also some other important aspects 
that should be taken into account when talking about the support o$ered 
by Europeans to the integration process. For example, Inglehart (1970) be-
lieves that higher levels of cognitive mobilization contribute to higher levels 
of public support for European integration as Europeans who have the op-
portunity to familiarize more with this subject become less reluctant towards 
a phenomenon perceived as an abstract one by many average citizens. On the 
other hand, Anderson (1998) assumes that the lack of knowledge about the 
EU determines the citizens of the member states to use proxies in evaluating 
EU policies, their attitude being, in fact, a re&ection at the European level of 
their view on the national politics. "us, their view on the EU depends on 
how individuals assess the internal political reality of their country, satisfac-
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tion with the domestic reality leading to support for the EU. Sánchez-Cuenca 
(2000) launches a hypothesis contrary to Anderson’s. He considers the EU as a 
solution for the problems in the functioning of national political systems and 
in his view citizens’ negative evaluation of the functioning of their state leads 
to greater support for the UE which is viewed as a solution for corruption, 
unemployment and poor governance. 
In addition to these assumptions that take into account the link between citi-
zens and the internal political reality in shaping support for the EU, there are 
hypotheses based on the relationship between national and European identity. 
While some researchers believe that these identities can coexist as two levels 
of identi#cation that become salient depending on contexts and needs, oth-
ers argue that the two are incompatible and mutually exclusive. Considering 
these relationships, Carey (2002) sees national identity as one of the main 
factors explaining attitudes towards the EU. According to him, a strong na-
tional identity results in weak support for the EU because of fears of national 
sovereignty loss through the implementation of European policies at national 
levels. Also, McLaren (2002) argues that hostility towards other cultures is an 
important element in justifying attitudes towards the EU because some indi-
viduals are concerned with the degradation of national values  in the context of 
the integration process aimed at reducing the physical and #nancial barriers 
of the nation-states.
"eories of support for EU integration are diverse, sometimes divergent, but 
they prove to be not so strong when tested individually. "erefore, we con-
sider that analyzing all these arguments identi#ed in literature could o$er a 
more complex perspective on possible calculations in&uencing European citi-
zens' opinions on speci#c EU policies and practices, each argument having 
a relevant role in shaping attitudes of the Europeans that have or have not 
undergone the European experience.
Economic costs and benefits model
Since the early 90s, studies on Europeans’ attitudes towards the EU have been 
dominated by economic and rational calculations, especially by utilitarian 
costs and bene#ts. A!er analyzing the level of public support for the Euro-
pean integration, many studies have concluded that individuals from coun-
tries that experience directly the economic bene#ts of the European integra-
tion show higher levels of support (Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Gabel & Palmer, 
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1995; Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998; Christin, 2005). "is is because one of the 
main objectives of European integration was to remove barriers to economic 
exchange, facilitate the free movement of goods, capital, services and people 
and create a single monetary authority (Marks & Hooghe, 2003). "erefore, 
economic calculations and utilitarian cost-bene#t evaluations of the e$ects 
of the EU integration process on the Europeans’ lives are among the #rst ex-
planations underlying the attitudes of European citizens towards integration. 
Among the most important studies on EU support that is primarily based on 
instrumental motivations are those of Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel 
(1998). "ey show that public attitudes towards the EU focus on the rational 
calculations of EU membership’s costs and bene#ts and that individuals’ level 
of support is related, on one hand, to the security and trade interests of their 
states, and, on the other hand, to their personal potential to bene#t from the 
liberalization of markets for goods, capital and labor (Gabel & Palmer, 1995). 
"e stronger the material gains of market liberalization in the EU, the stronger 
the support for integration. However, individuals’ level support varies because 
European policies a$ect them di$erently. Europeans experience di$erently 
the costs and bene#ts of integration due to some important factors such as 
human capital, income levels and proximity to foreign markets.
An issue to consider is the integration of various EU countries in the Eu-
rozone. "is is a desired shared by most of the Eastern European countries, 
including Romania, being associated with positive general outcomes for the 
population. Still various economic and #nancial evolutions, as well as the po-
litical ones in the EU lead to modi#cations in the accession plans (Anghel & 
Dinu, 2013). "erefore, these aspects as well as the integration or postpon-
ing of the currency integration also impacts the way EU is viewed in various 
countries. 
Several researchers support the hypothesis that markets liberalization favors 
those with higher levels of education, income and occupational skills (Ingle-
hart, 1970; Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Anderson & Reichert, 1995; McLaren, 
2002; Carey, 2002; Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Elgün & Tillman, 2007). In regard 
to the human capital hypothesis, Gabel and Palmer (1995, p.7) agree that "cer-
tain individual skills are more valuable and transferable in an advanced indus-
trial economy". "erefore, Europeans with higher levels of education and oc-
cupational skills are more willing to use their skills in an international context 
and to adapt diverse economic changes. On the other hand, less educated and 
poorly skilled Europeans become reluctant to the integration process as they 
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feel disadvantaged because of their less transferable skills on an expanded la-
bor market. In this case, human capital is a strong indicator of individuals’ 
ability to adapt to the labor market competition (Gabel, 1998) developed with 
the liberalization of the European labor market. McLaren (2006) considers 
human capital to have an essential role in explaining public support for the 
EU given that those with higher levels of education and professional skills 
can use their knowledge and skills to #nd better paid jobs, to increase their 
salaries by threatening to migrate to another EU state where people in their 
position are better paid, or to go to another EU member states to open their 
own business. "erefore, the most advantaged will be more optimistic about 
integration and much more willing to express their support for the opportuni-
ties it o$ers. 
As regards the income hypothesis, the same researchers observe a positive 
relationship between high income levels and support for European integra-
tion. "ose with higher incomes will bene#t more from the capital market 
liberalization as they bene#t from greater investment opportunities provided 
by the more open #nancial markets (Gabel, 1998). "e proximity to other 
EU markets hypothesis predicts that citizens in states located close to foreign 
markets bene#t from more opportunities in exploiting the liberalized markets 
for goods, labor and capital. According to Gabel and Palmer (1995), European 
citizens who live near the borders with other EU countries bene#t more from 
increased economic exchanges among neighbouring states than those who do 
not live in such regions. "erefore, residents of border regions show more EU 
support as they have the opportunity to experience directly these commercial 
bene#ts of the integration.
Gabel and Palmer’s hypotheses (1995) support the ideas of  Anderson and 
Reichert (1995) and Christin (2005) that the so-called winners of integration 
are more likely to support their country's membership than losers. Anderson 
and Reichert (1995) analyzed if the EU integration economic bene#ts in&u-
enced Europeans’ support and concluded that individuals living in countries 
that enjoyed more advantages as EU member states and those who experi-
enced directly those bene#ts were more likely to support the integration pro-
cess. "e two researchers focused on assessing the direct and indirect eco-
nomic bene#ts or personal and national bene#ts associated with EU member-
ship in order to justify the variation in EU support. Direct economic bene#ts 
were seen as the funds provided by the EU to member states or individuals, 
while indirect bene#ts were those associated with EU membership, such as 
trade with other member states, opportunities for professional mobility. In 
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respect of the direct bene#ts, Brinegar et al. (2004) argue that residents of 
states that are net bene#ciaries of EU funds are likely to support European 
integration, while states that donate funds tend to adopt a negative attitude. 
Anderson and Reichert (1995) concluded that citizens and states that ben-
e#ted personally, directly and systematically from the economic advantages 
of the EU membership were more engaged in supporting a more integrated 
European community. 
So, those who are aware of the positive e$ects of the integration on their 
country's economy will be more likely to support the European project. Re-
searchers have identi#ed two types of attitudes: egocentric and sociotropic 
(Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Brinegar et al., 2004; Bruter, 2005; McLaren, 2006). 
Individuals support policies that are bene#cial both for their economy (socio-
tropic evaluation) and for themselves (egocentric evaluation), which indicates 
that "continued support for integration will depend on the EC’s ability to 
respond to the economic demands of its citizens. In other words, those least 
able to bene#t from EC membership should not be expected to support the 
EC solely because the EC is advantageous for their nation as a whole" (Gabel 
& Palmer, 1995, p.13). Individuals who are more optimistic about both their 
own #nancial situation in the future and their country’s will show more sup-
port for integration (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998; Marks & Hooghe, 
2003). But the absence of one of these conditions will implicitly lead to a 
decrease of support. 
On the other hand, Christin (2005) analyzed the evolution of Europeans’ at-
titudes towards the EU both at individual level and macro level and noted 
that the e$ects on individuals’ attitudes were stronger when their country's 
economic situation was precarious. In such situations, the European Union 
is seen as a solution for the domestic economic problems that individuals ob-
serve in their countries. In states that bene#t from a good economic develop-
ment, people are more skeptical in supporting European integration.
Instrumental arguments justifying di$erent levels of support for European in-
tegration among EU citizens may be di$erent, but what is certain is that they 
depend on the economic contexts that Europeans are exposed to, but also on 
the direct experience with the bene#ts of EU membership, as it is expected that 
“those who regard the Common Market as having a bene#cial e$ect on their 
own lives to become progressively pro-European" (Inglehart, 1970, p.67). "is 
idea is found in a study of Elgün and Tillman (2007, p.392), which focuses 
on an essential dimension of the costs and bene#ts model, claiming that "the 
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e$ect of utilitarian bene#ts varies by the respondent’s experience with the eco-
nomic consequences of EU membership". In other words, individuals cannot 
assess positively or negatively the economic consequences of the EU member-
ship until they experience them directly: "Put simply, individuals cannot de-
velop a positive or negative assessment of the economic consequences of EU 
membership until they learn just what these consequences are. Individuals 
with little exposure to EU policies are unlikely to have independent and struc-
tured opinions about the economic e$ects of integration, meaning that these 
in turn are unlikely to predict attitudes toward integration. As the individual 
becomes more familiar with EU policies, then she or he can begin to judge 
their costs and bene#ts. Only then these judgments begin to predict support 
for integration" (Elgün & Tillman, 2007, p.393). Direct experience is impor-
tant in evaluating the intensity of Europeans’ attitudes towards integration as 
compared to opinions formed through proxies in cases in which individuals 
do not have the opportunity to undergo directly through the European expe-
rience, which we will discuss later.
"e economic costs and bene#ts model seems to be relevant for discussions 
on the emergence of a civic European identity and European economic poli-
cies seem to become identity-building elements ("iel, 2011). However, in 
literature there are a number of other variables that seem to in&uence the 
attitudes of European citizens towards integration. Elgün and Tillman (2007) 
claim that before having more experience with EU policies and before feeling 
the e$ects of integration, Europeans focus on non-economic evaluations of 
national politics and on their social identity. 
 
Non-economic models
Contrary or in addition to the utilitarian arguments behind di$erent levels 
of support that European citizens show for integration, researchers have pro-
posed di$erent models to explain support for or opposition to European in-
tegration. "ey focus on individuals’ access to information on EU policies 
(Anderson & Reichert, 1995), the social location of Europeans (Inglehart, 
1970; Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Janssen, 1991), national identity (Carey, 2002; 
Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Citrin & Sides, 2004; McLaren, 2002, 2006), support 
for the national government and political parties (Gabel, 1998). Arguments 
for these models are also diverse and divergent but equally relevant as the eco-
nomic ones. "us, as there is no consensus on the nature of the elements that 
lead to support for European integration and their capacity to produce e$ects 
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on the attitudes of European citizens towards integration, we consider these 
non-economic models to be as important as the economic ones.
Social location model
"is model states that social development factors, such as higher levels of in-
come, education and access to information, lead to increased public support 
for supranational European institutions and identi#cation with a transnation-
al European community, as individuals manage to process information about 
events and processes related to the European community and understand ab-
stract issues related to the integration process. In this respect, Inglehart (1970, 
1971) suggests in several studies that we can discuss about two important fac-
tors that in&uence public support for European integration: cognitive mobili-
zation and postmaterialism.
According to the cognitive mobilization theory, higher levels of education and 
increased access to information develop the ability of citizens to receive and 
process messages on EU policies, which might prove to be too di%cult, too ab-
stract or insu%ciently important for common citizens: „"e ability to handle 
abstractions, to process information about remote and complex entities (such 
as the European Community) lies at the heart of the Cognitive Mobilization 
process, and formal education tends to increase these skills” (Inglehart & Ra-
bier, 1978, p. 86). "e term “abstraction” which Inglehart uses while referring 
to the European Union is related to the ease with which people can under-
stand European political messages so that they can assimilate and use them 
in their everyday lives. As Janssen (1991, p.467) mentions, „the better skilled 
do not fear politics and institutions on a European scale simply because they 
have the capacity to understand them better, with the result that European 
integration is less threatening”. 
Inglehart (1970, 1971) believes that the cognitive mobilization process, which 
involves a higher capacity to understand abstract political messages about 
the European community and some kind of familiarity with the European 
policies, focuses on a number of independent variables that tend to lead to 
pro-European attitudes or on “predictors of pro-European attitudes” (Ingle-
hart, 1970, p.51) as social class, income, education, sex, age, exposure to dif-
ferent forms of mass media, the opportunity to travel abroad. „In the long 
term, therefore, it would seem that rising levels of income, education, and 
communications development favor the growth of public support for supra-
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national European institutions” (Inglehart, 1970, p.70). Inglehart and Rabier 
(1978, p.83) consider education as the most powerful indicator of EU support: 
„European integration bene#ts the upper and middle classes more than the 
working class, thus the fact that the more educated are relatively favorable to 
integration is simply an expression of social class interest”. "erefore, the cog-
nitive mobilization theory assumes that the level of education may lead to the 
development of pro-European feelings through exposure to European politi-
cal messages. Inglehart (1970) found a positive relationship between income 
level and pro-European attitudes as higher incomes favor travel opportunities 
in other member states and thus interaction with other Europeans. Janssen 
(1991) challenges the macro level e$ects of cognitive mobilization on public 
attitudes towards the EU, noting that personal skills have no impact on EU 
support but in turn they raise awareness of integration and help individu-
als experiment cosmopolitanism. He does, however, agree on the micro level 
e$ects of individuals’ personal skills of individuals, stating that people with 
more knowledge about the integration process tend to exhibit a more cosmo-
politan and more positive outlook towards integration.
Regarding postmaterialism, Inglehart (1970, 1971) argues that postmaterial-
ists tend to manifest cosmopolitan attitudes and are more committed to Eu-
ropean integration, since they give priority to their intellectual needs, their 
need for belonging, independence and self-actualization. On the other hand, 
materialists are interested in economic and physical security, being less cos-
mopolitan in their outlook. Since the theory was strongly disputed (Janssen, 
1991; Anderson, 1998) as there were not identi#ed links between increased 
postmaterialism and the evolution of public support for integration we would 
not insist on it. 
National proxies model
Another non-economic model is that developed by Anderson (1998) which 
combines both economic and political reasons. He considers the argument 
that individuals support European integration from a cost-bene#t perspective 
as insu%cient because it ignores the political dimension that is essential for a 
complete understanding of EU public support. 
If Inglehart (1970, 1971) focuses on a higher level information of individuals 
to explain the increase in EU public support, Anderson takes into account the 
lack of information on European a$airs and identi#es an alternative argument 
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in explaining changes in their attitudes towards the EU: "[…] because citi-
zens of the member states are largely uninformed about Europe, they employ 
proxies rooted in domestic political considerations (government, party, and 
system support) when responding to questions about the integration process” 
(Anderson, 1998, p.571). "us, individuals transfer their opinions about the 
domestic political reality at the European level and citizens that assess favor-
ably the e%ciency of the internal political institutions will support integration 
e$orts as they associate the internal economic and political performance with 
the integration process. "erefore, citizens’ attitudes towards government and 
ruling parties represent a key element a$ecting EU public opinions on Europe 
(Anderson, 1998; Elgün & Tillman, 2007). 
Anderson (1998, p. 583) propuses this model which combines economic and 
political arguments because „when citizens are unwilling to support the pro-
Europe policies of unpopular governments or parties, for example, economic 
conditions may have a smaller and indirect in&uence on the ups and downs 
of the integration process”. "is model excludes the condition of direct ex-
perience with the e$ects of EU membership and could be an explanation for 
the attitudes of those who fail to perceive the bene#ts of integration through 
travel, education or markets liberalization. 
Democratic performance model 
In terms of the relationship between national and European policies, there is 
another theory which states that lack of trust in national governments, po-
litical instability and corruption are decisive determinants in respect to the 
public support for the European Union which is perceived as a solution for 
consolidating democracy in countries a$ected by a poor performance of the 
state (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Rohrschneider, 2002; Christin, 2005; Tanasoiu 
& Colonescu, 2008; Durach & Bârgăoanu, 2013).
Sánchez-Cuenca (2000, p.147) believes that public support for the EU is 
higher when assessments of the national political institutions are unfavorable 
and European integration is seen as a means of strengthening and stabiliz-
ing national democratic institutions: „[...] the higher citizens’ opinion of the 
functioning of supranational institutions and the lower that of national in-
stitutions, the greater their support for integration. "is is because the worse 
the opinion of the national political system, the lower the opportunity cost of 
transferring sovereignty to Europe”. 
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"us, when the e%ciency of national democratic institutions is low, citizens 
will be more con#dent in the ability of the EU to solve their problems by 
putting in place monitoring mechanisms of their national political system. A 
number of studies in Central and Eastern Europe (Christin, 2005; Tănășoiu 
& Colonescu, 2008; Durach & Bârgăoanu, 2013) support this hypothesis. 
Tănășoiu and Colonescu (2008) tested it on the Bulgarian public and conclud-
ed that individuals who believed strongly in democratic values  had a favorable 
attitude towards European integration, considering that a!er their country's 
accession to the EU the national regime had to strengthen its democratic val-
ues  thanks to the constant monitoring from Bruxelles. Durach and Bârgăoanu 
(2013, p.70) carried out a research focused on the young generation in Roma-
nia and concluded the European Union was considered “a watchdog of de-
mocracy”, “rescuer” and “problem solver” for Romania that could not solve its 
internal problems without support from the European institutions, regarded 
as “legitimate actors” in Romanian political a$airs. On the other hand, the 
idea of  European intervention and monitoring mechanisms put in place in or-
der to ensure the compliance of the member states with the democratic values 
launched another image of the European Union, that of "Europe that punishes 
us" and “EU that scolds us like a parent or teacher" (Durach & Bârgăoanu, 
2013, pp.70-71). 
On one hand there is this image of the EU as rescuer in respect to the internal 
problems, but, on the other hand, there are academics who claim that the 
democratic e%ciency of the European institutions is also essential for an in-
crease in EU public support (Rohrschneider, 2002; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 
2011). "us, „if Europeans believe that EU institutions fail to adequately rep-
resent their interests and are no longer transparent, this undermines the core 
of the EU’s raison d’etre, certainly in the long run” (Loveless & Rohrschneider, 
2011, p.5). "is is even more relevant to those situations when national insti-
tutions are considered to be e$ective and citizens feel that the potential costs 
of transferring national sovereignty to some supranational bodies are too high 
for a wider European integration of their countries. 
National identity and cultural threat models
 
"ese two models view national identity as a key element in explaining in-
dividuals’ attitudes towards the EU. In order to understand how the public 
assesses European integration, we must examine the level of attachment that 
individuals have towards their nation or, as Hooghe and Marks (2004, p.418) 
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state, if individuals believe that national identity “can go hand in hand with 
the process of European integration or that European integration limits or 
threatens their national identity”. 
Regarding the relationship between national identity and EU public support, 
Carey (2002, p.388) has developed a model which suggests that „feelings of 
national identity are highly important in an individual’s choice to support 
the European Union. It is expected that higher feelings of national identity 
decrease support for the European project because of the con&icts over sov-
ereignty that have developed in this era, such as the creation of a single Eu-
ropean currency, the European Central Bank and the increased primacy of 
European law”. 
Although Carey (2002, p.402) argues that a strong national identity is a clear 
indicator of a decrease in support for the EU, he does not exclude situations 
in which “a strong national identity is not necessarily a negative predictor of 
support for the EU if the individual also has a strong attachment to Europe”. 
"erefore, this model takes into account the individuals’ feelings of belonging 
to the EU and possibly other determinants such as the economic, social and 
utilitarian ones that we have mentioned above. Europeans support the EU as 
long as they feel that it helps their nations ensure their needs (Van Kersbergen, 
2000), as long as it does not threaten national sovereignty (Carey, 2002) and 
attachment to a state is not necessarily associated with the rejection of the 
European project (Marks, 1999). 
In order to assess the way in which individuals perceive their national iden-
tity, Carey (2002) uses three conceptualizations of national identity: the in-
tensity of feelings towards one’s country, the level of attachment to the nation 
as compared to other territorial entities and the fear of other identities and 
cultures. McLaren (2002, 2006) has developed on this third conceptualization 
which refers to the cultural threat that the European integration exerts on the 
existing national culture. He believes that previous “research has missed an 
obvious but important factor that determines levels of support for, or hostility 
toward, the process of European integration. "at factor is degree of antipathy 
toward other cultures stemming from nationalistic attachments” (McLaren, 
2002, p.551). According to the cultural threat theory, some individuals are 
concerned about the degradation of national resources and about the social 
and cultural threats posed by other ethnic or national groups to the nation-
states with the EU enlargement.
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"ese concerns over national culture have emerged because, as mentioned 
earlier, the European Union has become more than an organization designed 
to reduce economic barriers and facilitate trade among member states, as it 
„is making policies that were formerly within the prerogative of the nation-
state, and it is likely to be seen as having a homogenizing e$ect on the member 
states. "e uniqueness of national cultures and the exclusive control over the 
resources of the nation-state are, in turn, seen as being under threat by the 
EU” (McLaren, 2002, p.554). According to this model, the EU is a political 
system in development that threatens not only the decisional independence 
of national institutions, but also core values  such as national sovereignty and 
identity.
Whether we discuss about economic calculations or other types of deter-
minants, EU public support varies according to the political and economic 
realities of each country, the history of each state, the year of accession but 
also to one’s own willingness to experience, accept and evaluate the e$ects 
of European integration. One of the key elements for an e%cient assessment 
of the relationship between European citizens and the European Union is to 
evaluate the way in which the UE is perceived in people’s lives and citizens’ 
expectations in regard to integration: the EU as a solution or a threat.
EU support and/or European identity
In literature, EU support and European identity are two terms that are some-
times used interchangeably, the former o!en being used as a substitute for 
the later (Inglehart, 1970; Inglehart & Rabier, 1978; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; 
Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; McLaren, 2002, 2006; 
Rohrschneider, 2002; Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Hooghe &Marks, 2004). In this 
paper we have chosen to discuss about the EU public support as being di$er-
ent from the notion of European identity because we consider that it is a term 
less complex and possibly more relevant in the absence of a strong sense of 
belonging to the European community among Europeans. 
On one hand, support for integration can be considered a precursor to the 
development of a sense of belonging to the European Union, as it actually 
provides generating elements of European identity. On the other hand, public 
support can be also considered an e$ect of European identity that aims at 
further all-level integration but which does not imply a relationship of pro-
portionality. 
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Bruter (2005) argues that the two attitudes represent two di$erent variables 
that must be tested separately from an empirical and conceptual point of view. 
In this view, Brigevich (2011) believes that attachment to the European Union 
is similar to European identity while EU support is determined by individuals’ 
awareness of their status of European citizens with common rights. Accord-
ing to the author, the two attitudes are two existential states that should not be 
confused and should be tested distinctly because higher levels of attachment 
to the EU should not automatically generate support for integration and vice 
versa. But which are the elements that di$erentiate them? 
When analyzing European identity determinants we consider similar factors 
to those addressed in assessing elements that determine support for EU inte-
gration: economic costs and bene#ts, the importance of cognitive mobilization, 
the relationship with national identity and with other social groups. And, in-
deed, there is a positive relationship between support and European identity, on 
one hand, and the economic bene#ts of integration, on the other. Young people 
with higher levels of education, income and occupational skill are advantaged 
by markets liberalization and they can understand more easily abstract topics 
related to EU. "at is why in their case the possibility for EU support to increase 
and a European sense of belonging to emerge and develop is higher. Di$er-
ences between the two attitudes result from the fact that the level of support 
changes especially a!er experiencing the economic costs and bene#ts of inte-
gration, while European identity intensi#es through Europeans’ awareness of 
their belonging to the community that enjoys these bene#ts. As Harteveld et al. 
(2013, p.548) state “identity is the product of deeper emotional investment or 
of prolonged experiences. A European identity may consequently function as a 
bu$er against more short-term notions, such as (perceived) costs and bene#ts”.
On one hand, support for the EU can be justi#ed through a variety of factors, 
but the most important argument is in fact the evaluation of economic costs 
and bene#ts of the European integration. Europeans are particularly interest-
ed in the bene#ts of EU integration and markets liberalization, the opportu-
nity to study, travel and do business in other member states much more easily 
than before EU accession. "is support is based on the directly experienced 
economic advantages of integration and is primarily linked to rational evalua-
tion of the European integration process. In this case, we can discuss about no 
a$ective attachment but economic rationality only. 
As one of the advantages of European integration is the common market, indi-
viduals are likely to become more supportive of the EU as they experience the 
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instrumental bene#ts of their status of European citizens. Easier access to Eu-
ropean markets associated with increased living standards, incomes and pro#t 
opportunities might lead in return to increased EU support. Furthermore, 
positive evaluation of the EU bene#ts and support result in identi#cation with 
EU membership’s economic advantages and thus EU economic policies can 
be seen as European identity-building factors. But this positive relationship 
between economic bene#ts and support for EU integration occurs as long 
as costs do not interfere with national and individual values. "erefore, the 
support that European citizens show towards the European Union is rather 
instrumental, utilitarian and less a$ective. "at is why when discussing the 
relationship between economic rationality and a$ective evaluation in regard 
to the EU we have to take into account not only the rational, instrumental ele-
ments but also the emotional, a$ective ones. On the other hand, when assess-
ing European identity we focus on the development of a sense of belonging to 
the EU and of its emotional side, a point which is not so pertinent when dis-
cussing about EU integration support. If identity involves by de#nition both 
a civic, instrumental or utilitarian side and a cultural, emotional one, support 
for an economic and political project like the EU does not necessarily require 
the emergence of this feeling that individuals are part of a large community, 
but awareness among them that they are involved in this project that is advan-
tageous both for themselves and their nation. 
European identity could lead to the development of a European political com-
munity based on the awareness of belonging to the European project and to 
the emergence of a European demos that would confer legitimacy to the EU 
and solve the democratic de#cit the EU su$ers from. In this case, individuals 
become aware of this status of European citizens and recognize themselves as 
members of this group and develop a collective identity beyond the idea of 
utilitarian and economic interests.
"us, another important element for the assessment of the two notions is that 
EU support and the opportunity of developing a European identity depend 
on how people perceive their national identity. A strong national identity and 
perception of integration as a threat to national cultural values  lead to lower 
support for the EU, but it can also lead to the strengthening of European iden-
tity if there are feelings of attachment to the European project and if integra-
tion does not threaten national values, but rather consolidates and valorizes 
them. Carey (2002, p.402) says that „a strong national identity is not necessar-
ily a negative predictor of support for the EU if the individual also has a strong 
attachment to Europe”.  
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However, there are di$erences in intensity between the two attitudes – EU 
support and European identity - based on the variables used when observing 
them. Citrin and Sides (2004b, p.177) note that integration support decreases 
for citizens who feel in some way Europeans when it comes to European in-
tervention in areas such as culture and education, which they “want to keep 
solely under national purview”. So the development of a European identity 
does not necessarily lead to absolute support for integration, but to support 
for those practices and policies that do not challenge speci#c elements of na-
tional identity. Support does not play an imperative role in developing a sense 
of belonging to the EU, but only for the development of awareness of belong-
ing to the European community, as it increases or decreases in relation to the 
democratic e%ciency of European and national institutions in the context of 
European integration. "erefore, public support could lead to the emergence 
of a civic European identity and not an a$ective or cultural one. It can help the 
EU attain the entitativity that Risse (2003, 2005) discusses about or concrete-
ness and realness” in the daily lives of European citizens.
We believe that the relationship between the two attitudes - support and iden-
ti#cation - can be bidirectional and cyclical. Public support for the EU can 
lead to identity through awareness of belonging to the European community 
and the European identity can lead to support for European integration at all 
levels – economic, political, social, and cultural. 
As we have mentioned, support for integration develops when the EU is con-
sidered to be a solution for the low level of democratization in nation-states, the 
support being strengthened by a direct experimentation of the integration e$ects 
that could lead to the development of a strong sense of belonging to this eco-
nomic and political project that embodies the democratic rescuer. At the same 
time, this sense of belonging generates further support for a European integra-
tion extended at all levels. Although we do not consider that support for Europe-
an integration should implicitly generate a European identity, it has a double role 
in fostering a sense of belonging and legitimizing the European project: the EU is 
“able to integrate the economies of its member states while protecting them from 
the wider global context. "is is primarily a functional, if not a technocratic, 
legitimization. As long as it delivers the goods and achieves a legitimacy through 
e%ciency, it has the support of citizens”, developing a sense of loyalty and provid-
ing a minimum degree of identi#cation (Delanty, 2008, p. 678). 
In this respect, Citrin and Sides (2004b) conclude that low levels of identi#ca-
tion with Europe can be correlated with high levels of support for European 
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integration and for the bene#ts of the EU membership. Also, the two have 
not identi#ed signi#cant di$erences between European citizens who show 
lower or higher levels of attachment to the EU and higher levels of support for 
EU integration. "eir most important point is that the level of support does 
not depend on the importance or priority that individuals grant to European 
identity in relation to the national one, but on its existence regardless of its 
intensity: „[...] creating support for a stronger European state does not require 
a European identity that dominates national identity. It is su%cient if a Euro-
pean identity is established alongside one’s national identity” (Citrin, Sides, 
2004b, p. 175). "erefore, regardless of its intensity, the European identity is 
necessary for the development of public support for European integration.
Also, in assessing the relationship between the two notions – EU support and 
European identity - Bruter (2005) believes that European identity is neces-
sary to generate support and legitimize further political development of the 
European integration process. A!er testing the two variables, Bruter (2005) 
has concluded that the statistical links among European identity, integration 
support and a range of traditional independent variables vary according to 
the European experience that individuals are being exposed to. In this con-
text, we consider that individuals who experience positively the economic 
costs and bene#ts of European integration are more likely to support the EU 
and further identify themselves as members of the European community 
with common rights and opportunities. We also think that support can be 
tested rather by using the economic costs and bene#ts model, while Euro-
pean identity involves a more complex process that includes both economic 
and a$ective evaluations. In this context, the question is: Can public support 
be su%cient for the legitimization of the European project in the absence of 
a solid European identity?
Conclusions
One of the purposes of this paper has been to present the factors that lead to 
public support for the European Union and for an extended European inte-
gration process in order to identify the most relevant elements that strengthen 
or decrease individuals' positive attitudes towards the European project.
Another objective has been to assess the di$erences between EU support and 
European identity, based on similar evaluation criteria, because as the emer-
gence of a European identity seems increasingly di%cult to attain, public sup-
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port for EU institutions, policies and values could be su%cient to legitimize 
the European project. 
"e conclusion is that while support is based mainly on instrumental motiva-
tions and rational economic evaluations, European identity implies attach-
ment to the European community that provides its members with both civic 
and instrumental values and cultural and a$ective ones. "erefore, EU sup-
port leads to awareness of European belonging especially through the eco-
nomic bene#ts associated with European citizenship and European identity to 
the development of an a$ective sense of belonging to this community. "us, 
economic policies as the liberalization of markets for goods, capital, people 
and services can become identity-building elements, as "iel (2011) states. 
Although we have not intended to establish an implicit relation of comple-
mentarity between the two notions, we consider that they can be viewed as 
being in a bidirectional or cyclic relationship as long as support for integration 
can generate European identity and the latter can result in support for further 
European integration. 
Also, given that the intensity and value of two variables may di$er among 
individuals depending on both national and personal contexts and situations, 
there is no relationship of proportionality between the attitudes mentioned. 
Although they seem to overlap in certain situations, we believe that a separate 
empirical assessment of these two types of attitudes could determine whether 
support for European integration could replace European civic identity which 
is considered by some academics (Kaelberer, 2004; Kantner, 2006) to be suf-
#cient to legitimize the European project. 
Acknowledgements: "e authors are bene#ciaries of the “Doctoral and 
Postdoctoral Scholarships for Young Researchers in Political Sciences, Ad-
ministrative Sciences, Communication Sciences and Sociology” project co-
#nanced by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectori-
al Operational Programme Human Resources and Development, 2007-2013.
References
Anderson, C.J., and Reichert, M.S. (1995). Economic Bene#ts and Sup-
port for Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis. Journal of Public 
Policy, 15(3), 231-249.
Economic Rationality and Support for European Identity Providers
396 | Laura-Mariana PARASCHIV, Monica-Florina GHERGHEL (2014)
Anderson, C.J. (1998). When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Do-
mestic Politics and Support for European Integration. Comparative Political 
Studies, 31(5), 569-601.
Anghel, L.C. and Dinu, M. (2013). Some thoughts on the appropriate mo-
ment for Romania to join the Euro area”, în Brătianu, Ctin., Zbuchea, A., Pîn-
zaru, F., Dinu, M., Oprea, D. (Eds), Proceedings of the Strategica International 
Conference (2013, Bucharest), Bucharest: comunicare.ro.
Brigevich, A. (2011). Identity, attachment to Europe, and decentralization 
in the French Regions. Paper prepared for the 2011 European Union Studies 
Association Meeting in Boston, March 3-5. Retrieved from http://www.euce.
org/eusa/2011/papers/11c_brigevich.pdf.
Brinegar, A.P., Jolly, S.K., and Kitschelt, H. (2004). Varieties of Capitalism 
and Political Divides over European Integration. In G. Marks & M. Steenber-
gen (Eds.), European Integration and Political Con"ict (pp. 62-89). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bruter, M. (2005). Citizens of Europe? #e Emergence of a Mass European 
Identity. Palgrave: Macmillan. 
Carey, S. (2002). Undivided Loyalties. Is National Identity an Obstacle to 
European Integration? European Union Politics, 3(4), 387–413.
Christin, ". (2005). Economic and Political Basis of Attitudes towards the 
EU in Central and East European Countries in the 1990s. European Union 
Politics, 6(1), 29–57.
Citrin, J., and Sides, J. (2004a). Can Europe Exist Without Europeans? 
Problems of Identity in a Multinational Community”. In M.G. Hermann (Ed.), 
Advances in Political Psychology (pp. 41-70). Oxford, UK: Elsevier. 
Citrin, J., and Sides, J. (2004b). More than Nationals: How Identity Choice 
Matters in the New Europe. In R. Herrmann, M. Brewer and T. Risse (Eds.), 
Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (pp. 161-85). Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Little#eld.
Delanty, G. (2008). Fear of Others: Social Exclusion and the European Cri-
sis of Solidarity. Social Policy & Administration, 42(6), 676-690.
Durach, F., and Bârgăoanu, A. (2013). Euroenthusiasm in Romania: Is the 
Romanian Youth in Favor of the European Union or too Apathetic to Object?. 
Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations, 15(1), 57-73.
Elgün, Ö., and Tillman, E.R. (2007). Exposure to European Union Policies 
and Support for Membership in the Candidate Countries. Political Research 
Quarterly, 60(3), 391-400. 
Gabel, M., and Palmer, H.D. (1995). Understanding variation in public 
support for European integration. European Journal of Political Research, 27, 
3-19. 
Management Dynamics in the Knowledge Economy | 397
Volume 2 (2014) no. 2, pp. 377-398; www.managementdynamics.ro
Gabel, M. (1998). Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical 
Test of Five "eories. #e Journal of Politics, 60(2), 333-354.
Harteveld, E., Van der Meer, T., and De Vries, C.A. (2013). In Europe we 
trust? Exploring three logics of trust in the European Union. European Union 
Politics, 14(4), 542-565. 
Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2004). Does Identity or Economic Rational-
ity Drive Public Opinion on European Integration? PS: Political Science and 
Politics, 37(3), 415-420. 
Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. Com-
parative Politics, 3(1), 45-70. 
Inglehart, R. (1971). Changing Value Priorities and European Integration. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 10(1), 1-36.
Inglehart, R., and Rabier, J-R. (1978). Economic Uncertainty and Euro-
pean Solidarity: Public Opinion Trends. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 440, 66-97.
Janssen, J.I.H (1991). Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public 
Support for European Integration. British Journal of Political Science, 21(4), 
443-468. 
Kaelberer, M. (2004). "e euro and European identity: symbols, power and the 
politics of European monetary union. Review of International Studies, 30, 161-178.
Kantner, C. (2006). Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understand-
ing. "e Case of the Emerging European Identity. European Journal of Social 
#eory, 9(4), 501-523.
Loveless, M., and Rohrschneider, R. (2011). Public Perceptions of the EU 
as a system of governance. Living Reviews in European Governance, 6(2), 5-38.
Marks, G. (1999). Territorial Identities in the European Union. In J. An-
derson (Ed.), Regional Integration and Democracy: Expanding on the European 
Experience (pp. 69-91). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little#eld. 
Marks, G., and Hooghe, L. (2003). National Identity and Support for Eu-
ropean Integration. WZB discussion paper SP IV 2003-202. Berlin: Wissen-
scha!szentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Retrieved from http://
www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/49727/1/371681197.pdf.
McLaren, L.M. (2002). Support for the European Union: Cost/Bene#t 
Analysis or Perceived Cultural "reat? #e Journal of Politics, 64(2), 551-566.
McLaren, L.M. (2006). Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integra-
tion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Risse, ". (2003). "e Euro between national and European identity. Jour-
nal of European Public Policy, 10(4), 487-505.
Risse, ". (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of 
European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291-309.
Economic Rationality and Support for European Identity Providers
398 | Laura-Mariana PARASCHIV, Monica-Florina GHERGHEL (2014)
Rohrschneider, R. (2002). "e Democracy De#cit and Mass Support for an 
EU-Wide Government. American Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 463-475. 
Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). "e Political Basis of Support for European In-
tegration. European Union Politics, 1(2), 147-171. 
Tanasoiu, C., and Colonescu, C. (2008). Determinants of Support for Eu-
ropean Integration. "e Case of Bulgaria. European Union Politics, 9(3), 363-
377.
"iel, M. (2011). #e Limits of Transnationalism. Collective Identities and 
EU Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Van Kersbergen, K. (2000). Political allegiance and European integration. 
European Journal of Political Research, 37, 1-17.
